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The Problem
The courts developed trademark law to serve a limited purpose: to facilitate efficient
competition by enabling merchants to adopt a particular word or symbol to identify their
goods, and prevent other merchants from using a confusingly similar word or symbol to
identify their own goods, when doing so would be likely to cause mistaken purchases. These
limited rights in words and symbols ensure that consumers can easily and quickly identify
and distinguish the goods of competing producers and effectively exercise their purchasing
preferences. This reduces consumer search costs and enables consumers to reward quality
through repeat patronase. The potential for repeat Datronaee in turn, enables producers to
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However, courts recognized that overprotection of marks can actually undercut marketplace
competition and efficiency by enabling mark owners to interfere unnecessarily with the flow
of useful marketplace information to consumers. Overly broad rights in marks may prevent
competing producers from effectively communicating the nature, qualities and characteristics
of their own products to interested consumers, or prevent competitors, consumers or the
media from engaging in critical product critiques and commentary. Overly broad protection
of marks may prevent or unnecessarily complicate development of new digital technologies
that assist consumers and promote competition by enhancing or aggregating available product
information. Overly broad protection of marks may enable mark owners to prevent competitors
from selling similar unpatented products and erect other barriers to market entry. Moreover,
rights in marks may intrude impermissibly on the public's First Amendment interests in
freedom of speech. Toensure that harmful overprotection would not occur, courts built a
number of limiting doctrines into the infringement cause of action, and have invoked a range
of external limitations as well.
Thus, trademark law is best understood as a careful balance of competing marketplace
interests. Nonetheless, over the years, the scope of trademark protection has gradually but
steadily expanded. Under modern marketing practices, marks have grown from symbols
to enable consumers to differentiate products to sophisticated selling tools, the subject of
tremendous investment and careful, expert sculpting. Mark owners have come to view marks
as vital business assets in themselves-"brands" that encompassand convey not just source,
but a whole construct of compelling imagery, prestige, personality, and hooks to facilitate
consumer self-identification with the product and thus cement brand loyalty.
Where investment goes, an inherent sense of property right tends to follow, regardless of
what black-letter law has to say about it. The notion of property arises from a deep-seated (if
perhaps misguided) sense of morality: if a person invests, then he should reap the full benefit
of the investment. To many neole it seems intrinsically unfair for others to sinhn off benefit
even when doing so mi
like theft. So as marks t
investment), additional
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romote the o ublic good iding feels uncomfortabl
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mind that the use caused no consumers
promoted consumer interests in price and
protected expression.
Mark owners communicate their attitudes about investment and property to courts and
the public: Investments need to be protected, and perhaps more harm, beyond undercutting
consumer reliance interests and deprivation of license revenue, arises from unauthorized
use of marks. Others' unauthorized use or reference to the mark may create new, unwanted
consumer associations with the mark, may distort or diminish the carefully cultivated brand
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traditionally has undertaken to address. Courts have nonetheless imposed infringement liability
for confusion about "sponsorship" or "affiliation" well beyond settings in which consumers
might rely on mistaken assumptions about relationship for substantive information about
product quality or characteristics. For example, courts have repeatedly relied on possible
consumer confusion about the existence of a license agreement to permit sports teams to
enjoin others' replication of their marks on the fronts of tee shirts and hats. It is unlikely that
consumers consider the possibility of a team license in evaluating the quality of the shirt or
hat. However, since good will for the sports team creates demand for the shirts, courts have
enabled the team mark owners (through their licensees) to monopolize the market for the shirts
and hats bearing team emblems, depriving consumers of the benefits of price competition.
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Further impacting the traditional balance of competing interests, courts have lost sight of
the "trademark use" requirement, which traditionally served as a limitation on the reach of
mark owners' rights. At common law, the infringement plaintiff was required to demonstrate
that the defendant used its allegedly infringing word or symbol "as a mark," to indicate the
source of its own goods or services, before the issue of likelihood of confusion could be
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letters and threat of expensive, protracted litigation undoubtedly chill many non-infringing,
pro-competitive, and First Amendment-protected uses of words and symbols, making the
actual, real-world footprint of trademark protection even larger than that defined by case
precedent. And as Eric Goldman pointed out in the course of Roundtable discussion, the
business community's understanding of the limits of "safe" (non-letter inducing) use of
marks informs the private policies governing use and reference to trademarks that media and
Internet service providers such as Google, eBay, and Twitter adopt and impose on their users
as "private law."
We are left with a "feedback loop," which a number of Roundtable participants have
discussed at one time or another. The broader the rights trademark owners assert, the broader
consumers believe the rights to be. And the broader consumers believe the rights to be, the
more likely they will assume that third-party uses and references are licensed (as they are
"required" to be). This leads courts to find that unauthorized uses and references to marks
mislead consumers (by causing them to think that the mark owner must have licensed them
when it has not). Courts accordingly impose liability, which leads mark owners to assert even
broader rights, which leads consumers to think even more uses must be licensed, which leads
courts to find even more actionable consumer confusion.
As Barton Beebe noted at the Roundtable, we are losing sight of the purpose of protecting
trademarks: we have come to see likelihood of confusion, in itself, as the harm to be
addressed. But likelihood of confusion is only evidence of other possible harm, which should
be fully identified and weighed relative to competing interests. How can we escape this cycle,
which seems relentlessly to lead to increasingly stronger trademark rights, at the expense
of competition, First Amendment, and technological development interests? I advance the
followin proosal as one ossible approach.
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dress, and trade name protection are premised on affirmative, albeit limited, ownership rights
in words or symbols. At the time the Restatement of Torts was drafted, there was general
consensus that the plaintiff should no longer be required to demonstrate the defendant's
fraudulent intent in trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement cases.21 However,
the ALI recognized that the fraudulent intent requirement should remain in place for claims
of passing off that did not constitute infringement of protected indications of origin. The
Restatement denominated this residual category of passing off claims "fraudulent marketing."
The Restatement defined "fraudulent marketing" as making a "fraudulent statement" that the
speaker is another person, or is the other person's agent or successor, or that the goods or services
the speaker is marketing were produced, processed, designed, or distributed by the other. The
accompanying comments elaborated that an actionable fraudulent misrepresentation could
take any form and be made in any manner "calculated to communicate its meaning."23 No
use of a protected trademark, trade name, or trade dress was required. Liability for fraudulent
marketing required that the speaker act for the purpose of inducing persons to purchase his
goods or services, and that the circumstances be such that consumers would likely rely on
the misstatement to the commercial detriment of the plaintiff.2 This requirement of likely
consumer reliance was essentially a requirement that the misrepresentation be material to
consumer purchase decisions.25
In 1995 , when the ALI undertook to draft the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition ,
the law had further evolved to the point that fraudulent intent was no longer viewed as
an appropriate prerequisite even for this residual category of passing off cases that the
Restatement ofTorts had identified as "Fraudulent Marketing."26 The Restatement of Unfair
Competition retained the residual category, but dropped the "Fraudulent Marketing" title
and designated the category as a form of "deceptive marketing." It stressed the distinction
between "deceptive marketing" and infringement of protected indications of origin,
emphasizing that even though infringement claims might literally fall under the definition of
"deceptive marketing," they should be brought pursuant to the sections specifically dealing
with trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement, and not under the rules set forth
for deceptive marketing.27
21. See Margreth Barrett, Reconciling Fair Use and Trademark Use, 28 CARDOZOARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2010).
22. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS supra note 19, 712.
23. Id. at cmt. d.
24. Id.§ 712 (emphasis added).
25. Section 712 defined actionable harm, or "commercial detriment," to include direct diversion of sales, when
the parties compete. It explained that when the parties did not compete, actionable harm took the form of injury
to the business reputation of the plaintiff's goods: "If the persons likely to rely on the actor's misrepresentation
are also likely to deal with the [plaintiff] or to purchase his goods, they may be dissuaded from doing so if their
experience with the actor's goods is unpleasant." Id. at cmt. g.
16 RETAEMN (HRD 1FUFI 1PTTON ur oe1,2 m.f m.d
27.Id.at cm. b
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The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition thus should be understood as prol
a cause of action for "residual" passing off claims that do not turn on infringement of
trademark, trade name, or trade dress rights and impose liability on a more conser
basis-requiring a specific demonstration of commercial detriment (and materiality), a'
when the defendant's misrepresentation does not communicate that the plaintiff is thes
of the defendant's goods or services (or the information inherent in the source-th
defendant's goods have the quality or characteristics of the plaintiff's).
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Cases denominated "passing off" under modern common law and Lanham Act 3(a) do
not focus on the plaintiff's proprietary rights in a mark or other indication of origin, or on the
defendant's use of protected words or symbols, as such. Rather, they focus on determining
whether the defendant's actions, under the specific circumstances of the case, will have the
impact of misrepresenting the source, sponsorship or affiliation of its products or services
and thus confusing consumers. For example, a number of "passing off" cases have addressed
situations in which the defendant uses the same generic word as the plaintiff to identify its
product or service. They have held that use of the same generic word, in itself, will not
constitute passing off, but a showing of additional acts or omissions on the defendant's part
may. For example, if the defendant is a later entrant to the field, courts may find that it has an
affirmative obligation to enable consumers to distinguish its goods from the plaintiff's-by
clearly labeling its products, adding additional, distinguishing words or symbols, adopting
dissimilar packaging or marketing materials, or by providing disclaimers. Or courts may
enioin the later-usinr defendant from takin affirmative actions that aeravate the likelihood
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Thus, just as in
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of "passing off"
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, Lanham Act 43(a) provides both a cause of action for
ions of origin and a cause of action for a residual category
t involve use of protected indications of origin). As in
no longer requires that the defendant act with fraudulent
intent. Many of the decisions do not expressly discuss the issue of materiality. In most cases,
it is unnecessary to do so, because the alleged misrepresentation suggests that the plaintiff
is the source of the defendant's product or service, and materiality can be assumed. The
Supreme Court's decision in the Dastar case nonetheless suggests that materiality remains
a highly relevant element in evaluating claims that deviate from that traditional scenario.
And there is precedent, in addition to the Restatements, for imposing an express materiality
requirement. For example, in King v. Ames,4 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
a 43(a) passing off claim on the ground that the alleged misrepresentation would not be
material to purchasers. In King, the daughter of a deceased blues singer sued the defendant,
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Infringement claims in which th
7t Ie
This would include Internet infringement cases in which the defendant has made a hidden
reference to the plaintiff's mark (for example, in web site metatags or as a key word to trigger
advertising), to which consumers are not exposed. It would also include cases in which the
defendantdoes not closely associate the allegedly infringing word or symbol with goods or
services that it is marketing, so that consumers are unlikely to understand the use as indicating
the source of the defendant's goods or services-for example Internet cases in which the
defendant incorporates the plaintiff's mark into its domain name, or features the mark on its
web site, but does not sell or advertise goods or services on the web site.
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d digital technologies, and First Amendment interests.4 Because they threaten to upse
roper balance of competing interests, they need a good, hard looking-over, beyond wh
rmally required for more "traditional" trademark infringement cases, before relief is
nted
Because these four classes of claims assert rights that exceed those generally necessary
to protect societal interests in avoiding confusion, and may impair other, competing societal
interests, they should be considered outside the framework of ownership rights in words
or symbols, like residual passing off claims that don't allude to marks or that only entail
use of similar generic words or symbols. Evaluating them as passing off claims, rather than
infringement claims, would hopefully downplay the influence of ownership and investment
and focus the courts instead on the practical impact of the defendant's actions. Outside of
the infringement context, courts should focus more critically on the nature and magnitude of
likely harm arising from the defendant's actions, in light of the surrounding circumstances.
In this less routine evaluation, courts might be encouraged to put the defendant's actions
into a larger context, and evaluate them in light of overall competition interests, their impact
on the parties' and the public's First Amendment interests, and on developing technologies.
These classes of claims are also better evaluated as "passing off" claims because there is more
precedent and flexibility to recognize and apply additic
and other limitations, beyond those imposed in trade
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When protection of marks poses special thr
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Courts could certainly find statutory language, legislative history, and case
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Imposing a materiality requirement in passing ott/associational marketing cases
problematic, however. Materiality is generally a matter of consumer perception, mu
likelihood of confusion inquiry. Undertaking to assess the materiality of misrepre
to consumers could augment the length, cost, and complexity of litigation, and t
increase the chilling effect that threats of litigation have on competition and First A]
interests. Moreover, we may encounter the same kind of feed-back loop with mate
we experience in the likelihood of confusion context. Just as mark owners have
consumers that all third-party uses of marks must be licensed (leading consumers
that any third-party use they encounter therefore is licensed), mark owners may
consumers that the existence of a license agreement provides material informa
quality (after all, rules regarding mark abandonment essentially require that ma
oversee the quality of their licensee's goods,69 rven if that requirement is rarely
Mark owners may also argue for an expansive understanding of "materiality"-fo
that the misrepresentation that a licensing relationship exists is material to
because it imparts the licensor's prestige and "personality" to the licensed goods
psychological boost to the image-conscious consumer.
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confusion might bring. In such cases it is the screen display generated as the result of the
hidden application that should be deemed the proximate cause of any subsequentconsumer
confusion and harm. To put it another way, the application of the mark is merely a means of
getting a message to consumers. It is the message itself that has the capacity to confuse them.
In the Internet context, this distinction may be particularly important, as different entities
may control the means and the message. "Imposing a proximate cause limitation may enable
Internet service providers to use marks to efficiently aggregate and index market information
for consumers, free from the chillin effect of mark owner threats of suit.
Of course, if courts succeed in tur
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such presumptions may assist to shape consumer perceptions, so that they are less likely to rely
on those presumptively non-confusing actions for material information. Bill McGeveran has
advocated creating statutory "safe harbors" that would simply exempt certain uses of marks
from liability, regardless of likelihood of confusion. Other Roundtable members expressed
concern that carving out specific exceptions or defenses to infringement may lead to further
doctrinal creep, encouraging courts to find actionable all uses that are not within the stated
scope of the exception or defense. Counterbalancing these concerns, express carve-outs would
reduce the cost and length of litigation and might discourage chilling threats of litigation in
cases in which the defendant's actions arguably fall within the carve-out. I would advocate a
judicially created irrebuttable presumption that actions consisting of non-commercial speech
cause no actionable likelihood of confusion. As McGeveran notes, the harm that relief would
pose to free speech interests would almost always outweigh the harm the allegedly infringing
speech poses to trademark interests. And to the extent that there are exceptions to this general
rule, the administrative costs of finding them will outweigh the value of doing so. During
Roundtable discussions, Rebecca Tushnet emphasized how defamation and false advertising
law tolerate false speech. Adopting a per se rule that occasionally permits such false speech in
the associational marketing cases seems equally acceptable in the interest of promoting First
Amendment values.74
Perhaps more central to my own proposal in this article, courts should not focus on the
similarity of the parties' marks when evaluating likelihood of consumer confusion in passing
off/associational marketing cases. The emphasis should not be on the defendant's use of "the
plaintiff 's" word or symbol, because the claim seeks relief beyond the scope of rights afforded
by trademark ownership-it asserts rights in the absence of the defendant's trademark use,
or for kinds of confusion that are not central to the core concerns of trademark law, or do not
directly lead to mistaken purchases. Rather, courts should consider the total context in which
consumers receive the defendant's alleged misrepresentation. In particular, if the defendant's
moduct has other source indicators associated with it. courts should consider the arnelioratin
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Limited Remedies
Finally, courts should cultivate more limited remedies in associational marketing cases, and
avoid outright injunctions against all use of confusing words and symbols. As several of the
Roundtable participants remarked, threats of litigation made through cease and desist letters
may pose greater harm to competition and free speech interests than do the results in litigated
cases. If mark owners are less certain of fully enjoining unauthorized uses of their marks, they
may be less inclined to litigate, and thus less likely to challenge such uses through cease and
desist rs.
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Ine propose pass asociational marketing cause of action is no panacea: it would
be far better if the infringement cause of action had not expanded to such a point that it requires
drastic counteraction. Judicial-driven reforms are messy and inconsistent, and there is no
guarantee that negative reactions to "free riding" won't find their way into courts' passing off
analysis, as they have in infringement claims." But the danger of that seems less severe than
in the "trademark right" context, and the passing off cause of action should prove flexible
enough to bring in countervailing concerns to moderate the anti-free-riding instincts. Courts
might encounter the most difficult issue, from a litigation standpoint, in making the initial
cut-deciding which claims fall into the delineated categories of "associational marketing"
claims and thus should he channeled into anassinI off analysis. My ownnreference would he
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